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committee (NOC) leveraged its power and author-
ity in the organization of an Olympic Games. The 
Sydney 2000 Olympic Games is the central case 
used in the study. The role of the Australian Olym-
pic Committee (AOC) as a stakeholder within in 
the host organizing committee—known as the Syd-
ney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games 
(SOCOG)—and more specifically in the organiza-
tion and management of the department responsible 
for sport at the Sydney Games is analyzed.
The article is structured as follows. First, how 
the Sydney 2000 Olympics Games were organized 
Introduction
There is still much to learn about the involvement 
of key stakeholders in the organization of the Olym-
pic Games. It has been suggested more research is 
required that explores issues relating to stakeholder 
power and the allocation of resources and the 
influence this relationship has on the staging of an 
Olympic Games (Parent, 2005). The purpose of this 
article is to drill down and look more specifically at 
these relationships. To address this knowledge gap 
the article examines how a host national Olympic 
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Sport-specific organizational activities at an 
Olympic Games can include the following areas: 
development of the sport competition schedule; 
planning and management of test events; develop-
ment of sport policies and operating procedures 
(i.e., sport medical policies and procedures); the 
management of the sport entries process includ-
ing the tracking of athlete qualification; develop-
ment and management sport results systems and 
sport related technology; sport presentation (i.e., 
lighting, sound, and announcements at competition 
 venues); scoping and development of training ven-
ues; procurement of sports equipment; development 
and creation of sport publications; doping control; 
sport medical; liaison with the international sport 
federation relations; national Olympic committee 
relations; and IOC relations (SOCOG, 2000).
Sport-related organizational activities at an Olym-
pic Games often includes (but are not limited to) 
the following areas: transport (i.e., athlete and offi-
cial transportation to and from the Olympic village 
to training and competition venues); venues (i.e., 
the planning and management of sport competition 
venues); catering (i.e., athlete and official meals at 
competition venues); villages (i.e., athlete and offi-
cial accommodation); workforce planning (i.e., the 
management of the volunteer recruitment process); 
accreditation (i.e., the development and manage-
ment of the accreditation process for athletes and 
officials); marketing (i.e., the consequences of event 
sponsorship on the procurement of sport equip-
ment); security (i.e., development of policies and 
strategies for athlete and venue security); broadcast-
ing (i.e., development of policies for athlete press 
conferences and mixed zone areas—the space where 
journalists can interview athletes immediately post 
event); ceremonies (i.e., the planning for athlete and 
official involvement in opening and closing ceremo-
nies); legal (i.e., development and implementation of 
legal strategies to counter ambush marketing); and 
logistics (i.e., the storing and transportation of sports 
equipment pre and post Games) (SOCOG, 2000).
Olympic Organization Studies
Olympic and mega-event research over the past 
three decades has largely focused on impacts and 
legacies (Cashman, 2006; Preuss, 2000). A small 
number of studies, however, have explored the 
is described. Second, a review of the literature rel-
evant to the study is presented together with a dis-
cussion of the key elements involved in managing 
sport at an Olympics. Third, the theoretical frame-
work and methodology employed are outlined. 
Lastly, the findings and analysis that emerged from 
the research are presented.
Organizing Sydney 2000
The governance structure of SOCOG was dif-
ferent to any Olympic Games held either before or 
since Sydney 2000. Typically, an organizing com-
mittee for the Olympic Games (OCOG) is governed 
by a single board, the makeup of which is stipu-
lated in the Olympic Charter. However, in 1996, as 
a result of a contractual resolution between two key 
Olympic stakeholders, the AOC (as the host NOC) 
and the New South Wales (NSW) Government 
(as the financial underwriter for the Games), two 
separate governance structures were established 
( Frawley & Toohey, 2009).
This meant, in effect, two distinct groups managed 
the Sydney Games, one with control and authority 
for the sport department and the other with the usual 
OCOG responsibilities (Toohey, 2001). The entity 
created with authority to manage the sport department 
within SOCOG was called the SOCOG Sports Com-
mission (SSC). The SSC consisted of six members. 
The AOC was given the power to appoint four SSC 
members while the NSW Government appointed the 
remaining two (Gordon, 2003). The President of the 
AOC was appointed the SSC Chairperson.
The sport department within an OCOG is typi-
cally responsible for a number of different planning 
and organizational activities. These can be broadly 
separated into sport-specific and sport-related actions 
(Frawley, 2013). Sport-specific orga nizational activi-
ties refer to tasks completed predominantly by the 
sport department (SOCOG, 2000). Sport-related 
organizational activities refer to tasks completed 
by non-sport department within an organizing 
committee that are critical to the sport department 
in delivering its program of work (e.g., transport, 
venue management, and villages). While the sport 
department is not usually directly in control of these 
departments it works with them to provide advice 
and data that help the Games’ coordination and deci-
sion making (Frawley, 2010).
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only the owners of the event (i.e., the IOC) that may 
have different goals and objectives, but also the key 
stakeholders that invest heavily in the event. Govern-
ments, for instance, may have as their primary aim 
the creation of economic growth through tourism and 
destination marketing strategies or through demand-
side activity such as bring forward major infrastruc-
ture projects (Preuss, 2000). The host OCOG and its 
employees are often motivated to be part of an excit-
ing project and for the Games they manage to be 
considered the “best ever” (Lowendahl, 1995). The 
IOC as the parent organization wants to grow the 
Olympic brand so it can strengthen sponsorship and 
broadcasting revenues and ensure its sustainability 
(Payne, 2006). Lowendahl (1995) argued that “the 
fact that there were three owners with very different 
objectives as well as numerous other stakeholders, 
made it impossible for any one owner to dictate their 
own objectives, routines, evaluation criteria exclu-
sively” (p. 353). While Lowendahl examined the 
complexity of project ownership when managing an 
Olympics, other studies have examined the planning 
features that influence the management of similar 
mega-events.
Event Planning
Bramwell (1997) and Theodoraki (2007) have 
investigated the importance of strategic planning 
in the management of international sport events. 
Bramwell’s (1997) research found that “too limited 
use of formal strategic planning may hinder [event] 
decision making” (p. 173) and that research and 
evaluation are required prior to and after event stag-
ing. Bramwell (1997) also argued that mega-event 
planning should be a participatory process, one that 
involves stakeholders in order to build the political 
legitimacy of the host organizing committee. Fur-
thermore, it is important for organizing committees 
to consider the longer term perspective beyond the 
event itself (Bramwell, 1997).
Theodoraki (2007) showed how event plan-
ning and organizational parameters influence the 
formation of an OCOG. Drawing on the work of 
 Mintzberg (1979), she highlights how OCOGs shift 
their job specialization from a department or func-
tional area structure to a venue-focused structure. 
For example, in the early stages of an OCOG senior 
management create departments such as “finance, 
internal organization of such events. For example, 
research has been completed investigating: orga-
nizational culture (McDonald, 1991), strategic 
man agement (Lowendahl, 1995; Malfas, 2003), 
strategic planning (Bramwell, 1997; Lesjo, 2000), 
stakeholder management (Parent, 2005; Theodoraki, 
2007), sport participation and development (Frawley 
& Cush, 2011), risk management and contingency/
security planning (Dobson & Sinnamon, 2001; 
Minis & Tsamboulas, 2008; Stamatakis, Gargalianos, 
Afthinos, & Nassis, 2003; Toohey & Taylor, 
2008), and knowledge management (Halbwirth & 
Toohey, 2001).
A clear gap in the literature at present is our 
understanding of the work of key stakeholders in 
the organization and management of specific OCOG 
departments, such as the sport department, at mega-
events such as Olympic Games. The relevant studies 
mentioned above, that are focused on project own-
ership, strategic planning, and stakeholder manage-
ment, are discussed in order to provide an overview 
of how the Olympic organization studies literature 
has developed over the past two decades.
Event Ownership
From a project management perspective, research 
conducted by Lowendahl (1995) into the staging 
of the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympic Games 
established that the effectiveness of the Games 
management was clearly influenced by the IOC 
and host OCOG relationship. The extent and level 
of project embeddedness determined the closeness 
of the fit between the project team (the OCOG) and 
the parent organization (the IOC). From this per-
spective, the fit of the parent organization and the 
project agencies were examined through the goals 
and objectives established by those agencies and the 
interrelationship between them (Lowendahl, 1995). 
Although it is standard in most projects for the par-
ent organization to establish the project goals and 
objectives, Lowendahl (1995) demonstrated that 
with the Olympics it is somewhat different.
Lowendahl (1995) argued that for many standard 
projects the parent organization determines the orga-
nizational structure employed, the resources devoted 
to each department, the control mechanisms and risk 
management strategies employed, and the evalua-
tion procedures that are adopted. In this case it is not 
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organization is the more complex and difficult it 
becomes to anticipate organizational outcomes. 
Olympic organization at the Lillehammer Games 
was therefore “complicated by unplanned and 
unintended consequences, as well as the strategic 
actions of powerful players who change their origi-
nal plans or have to negotiate compromises with 
subaltern groups” (Lesjo, 2000, p. 292). Lesjo fur-
ther argued that other elements such as the weather 
cannot be entirely anticipated or even controlled by 
the best prepared Olympic planners. For instance, 
nice weather at an Olympics not only enhances the 
spectator and athlete experience, it also allows the 
media to broadcast images of the host city that are 
highly favorable and attractive.
Event Stakeholder Management
Over recent years strong research examining the 
roles of stakeholders in the organization of mega-
sport events has been conducted by Parent (2005, 
2008), Parent and Deephouse (2007), and Parent and 
Seguin (2007). This research has mainly centered 
on how event stakeholders shape and are shaped by 
event organizing committees. Parent (2008) and Par-
ent and Deephouse (2007), for instance, conducted 
a study on the 1999 Pan American Games and the 
2001 Jeux de la Francophonie. Through interviews 
with event managers Parent and her colleagues found 
that the theories regarding event structure and evolu-
tion as proposed by Getz (1993) and Hall (1992) did 
not accurately reflect the events they investigated. 
Instead, organizing modes were more often influ-
enced by emerging issues and strategies rather than 
through formal organizational structures.
Another study explored stakeholder involve-
ment in the organization of the 2005 World Swim-
ming Championships (Parent & Seguin, 2007). This 
research utilized stakeholder theory in order to under-
stand the management difficulties that were faced by 
the organizing committee. Parent and Seguin (2007) 
found that “a lack of formal financial commitments, 
power congruence between partners and the persua-
sive politics, communication, proper human resource 
management procedures, and proper due diligence 
emerged as the critical combination of factors” 
(p. 187), resulting in a large organizational failure.
When examining the organization of the Syd-
ney 2000 Olympic Games, Malfas (2003) similarly 
marketing, IOC, and Government relations. As 
these areas become more established and new staff 
are appointed, specialization increases horizon-
tally to reflect the various levels of responsibility” 
( Theodoraki, 2007, p. 166). The increasing special-
ization of an OCOG immediately before the Games 
results in many staff shifting from department posi-
tions at headquarters to new positions at Olympic 
venues. This change demonstrates the shift from 
an organizational planning phase to an operational 
venue-based phase (Theodoraki, 2007). In some 
OCOGs this process is referred to as “venueiza-
tion” (Frawley, 2010).
Although the work of Bramwell (1997) and 
 Theodoraki (2007) focused on intended strategic 
decision making, the work of Lesjo (2000) explored 
the impact that unintended consequences have on 
Olympic organization. Lesjo (2000) utilized Elia-
sian process sociology as a framework to help exam-
ine how ideas and plans established by an Olympic 
bid committee “change radically” (p. 292) due to 
unplanned circumstances. Lesjo explored why the 
1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympic Games became 
known for its environmental focus. He argued that 
the image of these Olympics as the “Green Games” 
(p. 293), while an important representation was 
not actually part of the original bid. However, an 
“unanticipated conjecture of symbolic politics and 
realpolitik produced Lillehammer’s eventual image 
as an environmentally friendly city. A key aspect 
of constructing this ‘green’ profile was the coopta-
tion of the environment movement” (Lesjo, 2000, 
p. 293) into Olympic planning.
Lesjo’s (2000) research showed the impact 
unplanned and unintended consequences had on 
the organization of the Lillehammer Games. As 
Olympic event planning can take place over more 
than a decade (from bid to staging) new information 
becomes available and organizational standards and 
processes can and do change. Drawing on Hill (1992, 
1996), Lesjo (2000) stated that the vast size and 
scale of the Olympic Games entwines “the bidders 
and hosts in unanticipated and complex figurations 
that they seldom understand” (p. 292). The research 
also illustrated the importance of understanding how 
the fluid and dynamic nature of stakeholder power 
relations influences event organization.
Utilizing the ideas of Elias (1994), Lesjo (2000) 
argued that the more democratic the mega-event 
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choice of this theoretical framework in helping to 
understand how the sport department was organized 
at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.
The processual analysis employed in the study 
was guided by a number of principles. First, impor-
tance is placed on the interdisciplinary research links 
between disciplines such as sociology and history. 
As outlined by Elias (1994), any analysis of social 
experience or organization without history is barren 
and indistinct. Second, the concept of interdepen-
dent networks (Elias referred to them as figurations) 
are viewed as structures of mutually oriented and 
dependent people who develop and change over 
time (Newton & Smith, 2002). Interdependent net-
works are therefore viewed as never being fixed but 
rather fluid and dynamic entities that change contin-
ually over time (Van Krieken, 1998). Third, devel-
opments in organizations are not only the result of 
planned action and agency but also due to unfore-
seen and unintended consequences of human action. 
As stated by Elias (cited in  Newton, 1999) “under-
lying all intended interactions of human beings is 
their unintended interdependence” (p. 417). The 
fourth feature of a processual approach is the cen-
trality of power in shaping and influencing human 
and organizational relations. Power in this instance 
is not viewed as a substance that can be possessed 
by any individual or group “but rather a characteris-
tic of all human relationships” (Murphy, Sheard, & 
Waddington, 2002, p. 93).
This particular perspective of power connects 
closely with the arguments presented by Foucault 
(1977). However, although power is relational it is 
also often asymmetrical with the balance of power 
between individuals and groups (organizations) 
in society rarely fixed or permanent (Arnason, 
1987). Within every network some individuals and/
or groups will have more central roles with greater 
authority and at any one point in time and will be 
relied upon more heavily (Dopson, 2005). As orga-
nizations develop over time we can therefore see that 
power relations “reflect a complex interweaving of 
interdependencies amongst people, a ‘networked 
agency’” (Newton, 1999, p. 420). This concept of 
power also closely aligns with the management 
research of Weick (1969), who has argued that when 
analyzing organizations “interdependence is the cru-
cial element, interacts rather than acts are the crucial 
observables that must be specified” (p. 330).
established that the event stakeholders influenced 
the workings of the host OCOG and therefore the 
event. The study highlighted the critical events that 
created organizational change for the host OCOG. 
These included: the observation of the 1996 Atlanta 
Olympic Games by senior management; the appoint-
ment of the NSW Minister for the Olympics and 
Paralympic Games, Michael Knight, to the position 
of SOCOG President; and the shift of SOCOG’s 
organization control to the Main Operations Cen-
tre in May 2000 (Malfas, 2003). Malfas found that 
although the IOC, as the parent organization, had 
final responsibility for the Olympic project, it del-
egated a large amount of work to the host OCOG. 
This delegation can create a weak organizational 
model because the host OCOG itself is often highly 
dependent on government and other commercial 
institutions in order to deliver the Olympic Games. 
As a consequence of this limited involvement by 
the IOC, the loose organizational model provides 
opportunities for stronger stakeholders to strategi-
cally leverage and maximize their interests.
Framework: Interdependent Processes 
and Olympic Organization
The changing relationship over time between 
central Olympic stakeholders (such as the AOC and 
the NSW Government) provides a useful case study 
in understanding the evolving nature of organiza-
tional power. Critical management theorists such as 
Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips (2006) argue that 
broader perspectives on the role of power in orga-
nizations is required in contrast to the common per-
spective in management theory, which views power 
as restrictive and as a negative force. The manage-
ment literature, for instance, has often viewed power 
in terms of conflict situations and the consequences 
of its illegitimate exercise (Clegg & Hardy, 1996). 
In attempting to understand organizational develop-
ment and the influence of power and human agency 
a processual approach has substantive utility (Van 
Iterson, Mastenbroek, Newton, & Smith, 2002). A 
processual perspective places an emphasis on ana-
lyzing shifting power relations between individu-
als as situated in an interdependent network that 
changes and develops over time (Dopson, 2005; 
Newton, 2001). The temporal characteristic of pro-
cessual analysis provides the foundation for the 
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of individuals within a defined population (Veal, 
2006). The value of this approach is that it allows the 
targeting of key representatives who are able to pro-
vide a detailed knowledge of a specific organization 
or situation (Gratton & Jones, 2004). After reviewing 
the initial data set, the researcher decided it would be 
worthwhile to increase the overall depth of the data 
collected for the study by completing the second 
round of interviews. Another advantage to emerge 
from the second round of interviews was that a num-
ber of the respondents had either worked directly for 
another OCOG post-Sydney 2000 or had consulted 
to one or a number of OCOGs and/or cities staging 
post-2000 Olympic Games. This additional experi-
ence provided these respondents with further knowl-
edge that, in turn, informed the study. The majority 
of the interviews were conducted in person while 
some interviews were conducted by telephone. The 
average length of the interviews was 1 hour.
The analysis of the data was completed in three 
stages. This included data reduction, data coding, 
and data verification (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Through reading and rereading of the interview 
transcripts data that was irrelevant to the study was 
excluded. As the interview transcripts were read 
and reread, key themes emerged. The software 
package Nvivo 7 was then employed to assist the 
management of the raw data through placement of 
relevant text into matching codes. As a result of 
this process, which included ongoing discussions 
with the members of research team, thematic cat-
egories were determined. Drawing on Gratton and 
Jones (2004), the data analysis was considered valid 
when the coding closely reflected what was being 
researched. Each code was distinct with minimal 
overlap, allowing for the data to fit accurately into 
each code (Veal, 2006). In addition, the research-
ers looked for statements that confirmed as well as 
refuted the research aims in order to build a rigorous 
data set (Bryman, 2004).
Findings
Legitimate Authority
As mentioned earlier, the SSC was formed as a 
result of contract renegotiations between the AOC and 
the NSW Government. The AOC’s power in relation 
To gain an adequate understanding of mega-event 
planning and organizing it is therefore necessary to 
examine the context of power and the values sup-
porting it (Flyvbjerg, 1998). As outlined by  Flyvbjerg 
(2004) “rationality without power spells irrelevance” 
(p. 292). The contextual emphasis therefore is not 
only the exploration of power relations but also on 
their supporting values (Flyvbjerg, 2001). In line 
with this theoretical approach the study investigated 
the outcomes of the AOC’s power relations with key 
Olympic stakeholders in the organization of sport at 
the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.
Methodology
As outlined earlier, the purpose of this research 
was to understand the impact of a host NOC in the 
organization of an Olympic Games. The research 
also attempted to develop an understanding of the 
role and practices of a host NOC as a key Olym-
pic stakeholder. To achieve this aim Sydney 2000 
Olympic Games were chosen as the central case 
study. The key research question was therefore 
framed in the following way: How did the involve-
ment of a host national Olympic committee influ-
ence the management of an Olympic Games?
To address this question a qualitative study was 
conducted that employed in-depth semistructured 
interviews. This approached allowed the researcher 
to draw on his experience and knowledge as a for-
mer Sydney 2000 employee and to collect deep and 
rich interview responses (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Great 
care was taken in this study to protect the identity 
of the respondents. Respondent confidentiality was 
treated as paramount at all times. In order to achieve 
this all interview transcripts were coded and stored 
separately. In total 35 interviews were conducted 
with former Olympic officials and senior SOCOG 
managers who were involved in the management 
and organization of the Sydney Games. Of these 35 
respondents, 25 were interviewed in 2002 and 2003, 
while the remaining 10 were interviewed in 2009. 
This second data collection was completed to obtain 
additional data and because access was obtained to 
very senior Olympic officials that was not available 
in the earlier years of the data collection.
The subject selection was based on the principle of 
theoretical sampling that involved the direct selection 
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of the SOCOG Board and could not be overturned 
by the Board. As the power of the AOC was embed-
ded in legislation passed by the NSW Parliament, 
the SSC was not regarded as another committee. 
“The difference with the Sydney model was that it 
[the SSC] was actually enshrined in legislation and it 
had quite significant powers” (respondent 5).
The creation and implementation of the SSC 
meant there was a reduced requirement for the 
senior managers within the sport department to 
rely only on their skills of persuasion and infor-
mal networks to get favorable decisions from the 
SOCOG Board. The extent of the power relations 
maintained by the AOC power, through the SSC, in 
the organization of the Sydney Games is described 
by respondent 31:
[The SSC] was absolutely paramount in ensuring 
the athletes got number one priority, in the whole 
bloody thing [they] did a very good job of that to 
the extent that a big issue like buses going to [ath-
lete] training, where [the NSW Government] were 
trying to save money, were saying we will send the 
bus with the team, once it has dropped the team at 
training it will disappear and we will send another 
one back to pick it up. [The SSC] said “get f . . . 
ed,” the bus will go with the team and it will stay 
with the team, right. So they [the SSC] won all 
those sort of battles, which were about service lev-
els, and it played a very good role and it was a 
really good way of dealing with the IOC, the inter-
national sports federations, and the NOCs.
Management Control
For the SOCOG Board, an unforeseen outcome 
and benefit of the establishment of the SSC was that 
it no longer had authority for the sport department. 
A crucial point made by the respondents interviewed 
for this study was that the SSC, with its authority and 
therefore its capacity to make quick decisions, was 
very effective given the complex nature of Olympic 
project planning and management. For instance, a 
respondent suggested the SSC had a: 
Major impact—it had the authority of the organiz-
ing committee, so if sports had things that they 
wanted to get done, as long as the SSC was happy 
with it, you were going to get it done, so I thought 
that was fairly critical—it was cutting back on the 
pathway you needed to go through to get things 
done, decisions made. (respondent 12) 
to the staging of the Sydney Olympics was consti-
tuted in legislation passed by the NSW Parliament. 
As such, it had legitimate authority within SOCOG to 
organize and manage the sport department. Accord-
ing to one respondent, the legitimate authority of the 
SSC meant it could make important decisions in a 
judicious and timely manner, reducing the “pathway 
you needed to go through to get things done, deci-
sions made” (respondent 12). In addition, the capac-
ity of the SSC to make fast and well- considered 
decisions was often juxtaposed by respondents with 
what “might have been” if these same decisions were 
left to the SOCOG Board. “If there had not been a 
SSC, it just would have taken so long to get decisions 
out of the Board” (respondent 9).
As a consequence of its authority the SSC was in a 
position to make sport-related decisions even though 
the SOCOG Board may have expressed a prefer-
ence for a different position or policy. As outlined by 
respondent 33, the formation of the SSC was “essen-
tially about the AOC retaining control of the key ele-
ment of the Games. The AOC had a significant role 
in the functioning of the SSC, by establishing sports 
policy that was consistent with the AOC’s focus on 
the athletes and Olympic principles.” From a similar 
perspective, respondent 9 commented that if criti-
cal sport-specific decisions were left to the SOCOG 
Board, they “could have taken months” because of 
the large number of financial and political matters 
the Board needed to manage.
Decision-Making Capacity
Such a decision-making capability was a cen-
tral strength of the SSC (respondent 5); the deci-
sions the SSC made could not be overturned by the 
SOCOG Board and SSC “decisions were made for 
sport and not the bloody SOCOG Board” (respon-
dent 9). Respondent 13, for instance, observed: 
“what it did do, it gave us a focal point, to give us 
what was truthful when we were dealing with the 
NSW Government, because it was so political [the 
Games]. Now if we hadn’t had the SSC then we 
would have never had [sic] got the truth.”
The interview participants noted that the perceived 
value of the SSC, through the organizational author-
ity it maintained within SOCOG, was based on the 
premise that the decisions it made were independent 
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have been much more difficult and “tougher for the 
people within the sport [department] to deliver it.” 
Furthermore, it was stated that without the authority 
of the SSC, the sport department would have been 
a “pretty low priority” for SOCOG (respondent 7). 
Although respondent 14 argued that the SSC “took 
control of decision making, the turnaround on deci-
sion making was immediate or as near immediate as 
it could be.” The formal power relations of the SSC 
therefore assisted the AOC in getting the required 
cooperation from a range of Olympic stakeholders. 
“I strongly believe without that high level of repre-
sentation and the firepower that the SSC had, sport 
would have had a lesser profile within SOCOG 
than it did have. The very strong presence of the 
SSC and the AOC were vital in ensuring there was 
a strong focus on sport” (respondent 7).
Unforeseen and Unintended Consequences
Other factors were mentioned by the respondents 
that supported the view that the creation of the SSC 
enabled SOCOG to deal with a range of critical 
issues that developed outside of the sport depart-
ment. Respondent 15, for instance, suggested that 
the SSC was especially important when considering 
the pressure SOCOG faced from unforeseen events. 
One example given was the Asian financial crisis 
that took place in 1997 and 1998 (respondent 15). 
This crisis was an unplanned event that was certainly 
beyond the control of the SOCOG Board, but had a 
significant impact on SOCOG’s ability to generate 
commercial income (respondent 31). In 1998, the 
SOCOG Board sharply revised downwards its spon-
sorship revenue forecasts principally because of this 
financial crisis (Toohey, 2001). This point is sup-
ported by the Official Report for the XXVII Olym-
piad, which stated that in 1998 and 1999 SOCOG’s 
financial position diminished: “proposed expendi-
ture was increasing and revenue projections were not 
being achieved, partly because of factors such as the 
Asian economic crisis” (Toohey, 2001, p. 31).
Power, Knowledge, and Leadership
It was also noted that OCOGs that have an experi-
enced sport department benefit from the knowledge 
that they can provide to other parts of the organi-
zation (respondent 25). In this way, organizational 
Likewise, respondent 29 stated that the SSC:
Had decision-making authority over everything that 
impacted athletes, from sports equipment procure-
ment to the quality of amenities in the village. Their 
role was particularly important in championing the 
needs of athletes. An example is the procurement of 
sports equipment. The agenda of the [SOCOG] pro-
curement program was to accept the lowest bid for 
any tender, regardless of technical quality. Whereas, 
through the sports equipment working group of the 
SSC, we were able to ensure that technical quality 
was the priority driver of tendering decisions.
Planning Cycle
Respondent 16 noted that the sport department 
within an OCOG is often disadvantaged because of 
the timing of its growth within the broader Olympic 
planning cycle. For instance, large project planning 
departments such as venue development and con-
struction are very resource dependent and start early 
in the Olympic planning cycle. This often means that 
these departments have access to resources and can 
create a firm power base early in the Olympic plan-
ning process. In contrast, sport-specific planning 
grows in scope and staffing considerably later in the 
organizational life cycle and intensifies as the start of 
the competition nears. This point was supported by 
an analysis of milestone planning reports that were 
developed by the sport department between 1998 and 
2000. These reports showed that when compared to 
other departments, sport was very dependent on the 
paid and volunteer staff quite late in the Olympic 
planning cycle. As suggested by respondent 16:
If [sport] is not taken into consideration and given 
the importance that it does have, because it is a 
sporting event, and have the people in a position 
of authority, power early on, I think sport would 
be, it would be tougher for the people within the 
sport department to deliver it at the end because of 
the nature of the timing of it. You see some depart-
ments are very big and very operative. Whereas 
sport tends to work with a small staff and build 
and you have a lot more staff numbers at the time 
of the Games, whereas other departments don’t 
necessarily do that, that is why it is so important to 
have it there [the SSC].
Due to the Olympic planning context, the author-
ity of the SSC became increasingly important. As 
outlined by respondent 16, without the SSC it would 
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within SOCOG, an examination of the AOC’s orga-
nizational power is required. Clegg (1989) offers a 
useful template for examining and explaining orga-
nizational power relations. His model argues that 
organizational power flows through three interde-
pendent but overlapping circuits. The circuit anal-
ogy is used to reinforce the relational and dynamic 
nature of power in organizations. The three circuits 
are called episodic, dispositional, and facilitative 
circuits of power. According to Bathelt and Taylor 
(2002), the episodic circuit examines “power as 
agency;” the dispositional circuit examines “power 
as relationships;” and the facilitative circuit exam-
ines “power as discipline” (p. 95).
Power as Agency
The episodic circuit concentrates on the causal 
characteristics that shape organizational power 
relations. In this first stage, the standing conditions 
that shape and influence power relations need to be 
understood (Clegg et al., 2006). A range of power 
characteristics need to be considered in this circuit. 
For instance, discovering who controls organiza-
tional resources and the nature of those resources: 
Are they human, financial, technological, or infor-
mational resources? In this stage, positional power 
and therefore organizational authority also need to 
be considered (Bathelt & Taylor, 2002). Using this 
perspective, Marriott (2008) has stated that formal 
authority in organizations is shaped by the contest 
for control of organizational resources: “control 
over resources is another form of power, as is control 
over knowledge and information” (p. 69). Further-
more, “organizational structures, rules, regulations 
and procedures, viewed as rational instruments, are 
seen as reflections of a struggle for political [and 
organizational] control” (p. 70). Formal authority 
is therefore shaped by the interdependence of both 
human agency and historically constituted social 
structures as they develop and change over time 
(Stacey, 2003).
The establishment of the SSC was a direct out-
come of the resolution of a dispute between the AOC 
and the NSW Government. The SSC was not a com-
mittee with little formal power or authority, rather 
it was an Olympic agency with distinct decision-
making power within SOCOG. The formation of 
the SSC was dependent on the agency of the AOC; 
knowledge shared by the sport department assists 
other functional areas in dealing with complex sport-
specific and sport-related planning and management 
issues. Importantly, it was noted that the sport depart-
ment should generate sustainable expectations, and 
its organizational power should not be used to cap-
ture resources that are wasteful and unnecessary. 
“The sport [department] leadership must manage 
their own clients’—international federations, com-
petition managers—expectations and ensure that the 
requirements for the Games are in line with actual 
needs and not wish lists that waste planning time” 
(respondent 25). This respondent, when interviewed 
in 2009, stated that he had been “involved in every 
[Olympic] Games since Atlanta” and from this expe-
rience had learned that:
OCOGs must have strong but balanced leadership 
as it relates to sport and the Games. When it isn’t 
strong the rest of the organization actually suf-
fers from the lack of good information on what is 
needed for the Games, i.e., sports, to be success-
ful. All of the other departments in the OCOG need 
good information and requirements from the sport 
to succeed in their planning. Being the “athletes’ 
Games,” the SSC had a strong hand in ensuring that 
theme remained a priority in the decision-making 
process. If a strong body like the SSC didn’t exist, 
one would question where the priorities of sport 
would fall within the OCOG. (respondent 25)
The legitimized decision-making authority of the 
SSC within SOCOG, therefore, provided the AOC 
with the capacity to achieve its central organizational 
objectives as they related to the Sydney 2000 Olym-
pic Games. Even with its authority within SOCOG, 
the AOC was still reliant on other Olympic stake-
holders in order for it to achieve the planned vision. 
The next section discusses these findings in the con-
text of the adopted theoretical framework.
Discussion
The AOC’s authority within SOCOG, as expressed 
through the establishment of the SSC, had signifi-
cant consequences for the organization of sport at 
the Sydney Olympics. The SSC maintained authority 
and institutional legitimacy for the organization of 
the sport department with the power to make sport-
specific and sport-related decisions within SOCOG. 
In attempting to understand the authority of the SSC 
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highly contextual. In order to build a more thorough 
understanding of mega-event organization, future 
research needs to be undertaken across multiple 
Olympic Games. Additional research should be con-
sidered that investigates Games that have already 
been staged. Such an approach could provide the 
opportunity for longitudinal analysis and a compari-
son of how various internal and external stakehold-
ers shape Olympic organization and implementation. 
In addition to the analysis of the role of host NOCs 
and host governments in Games organization other 
key stakeholders (i.e., the international sport federa-
tions, sponsors, host broadcasters, and international 
media) should be explored.
Through the analysis of multiple Olympic 
Games, the findings from this study can be further 
developed, extended, and refined. Such research 
could explore how Olympic stakeholders, such as 
host NOCs, design their organizational priorities 
and strategies when they are involved in the man-
agement of an Olympics. A longitudinal approach to 
researching Olympic organization, therefore, would 
add a great deal to the existing mega-event body of 
knowledge. This longer term research perspective 
also fits well with the approach outlined by  Eliasian 
organizational theorists. Researchers such as New-
ton (2001, 2004) and Dopson (2001, 2005), for 
instance, recommend that management researchers 
should spend more time considering the broader 
historical context when analyzing organizational 
development and change. They argue that such an 
approach provides management researchers with 
a fuller understanding of the organizational inter-
dependencies that shape stakeholder involvement 
and performance. Ultimately, this means that host 
NOCs as a vital stakeholder of the Olympic Games 
can achieve a deeper understanding of how they can 
best position themselves in order to achieve their 
organization’s objectives.
A second area worth exploring through future 
research is the role played by host NOCs in 
other parts of an OCOG outside the sport depart-
ment. There is scope for researchers to explore, 
for instance, the role of the AOC in the planning 
and organization of the Olympic village at the 
Sydney Games. The AOC, through the SSC, not 
only managed the SOCOG sport department but 
also played a prominent role in Olympic village 
(p. 89). On one hand the establishment of the SSC 
reflected the level of authority and control the AOC 
maintained within SOCOG, but on the other hand 
it also highlighted the interdependent relationship 
it had with the NSW Government. The AOC, as the 
host NOC, not only maintained institutional power, 
as formulated by the Olympic Charter, but it also 
began with and maintained substantial Olympic 
knowledge and expertise. The formation of the SSC 
allowed the AOC to use and maximize its knowl-
edge and experience within SOCOG. Knowledge 
and experience can play a “key role in extending, 
limiting, and otherwise shaping” organizational 
resources and property rights (Clegg, 2003, p. 536). 
Through the formation of the SSC, the AOC shaped 
its own Olympic future as well as the future experi-
ences of its constituents, the Olympic athletes the 
AOC stated it was there to serve and be “governed” 
by. As outlined by Dahl (1961), power researchers 
need to develop an understanding of organizations 
by asking the question: “Who governs?” More-
over, Putnam (1976) has commented that insofar 
as organizational decisions matter, so too do orga-
nizational decision makers. Having people with 
power who knew the Olympic movement and who 
made decisions in the best interests of the athletes 
was regarded as a critical feature of the SSC and 
the Sydney Olympics by those who worked in and 
managed the sport department.
The AOC’s institutional power within SOCOG, 
and especially its ability through the SSC to make 
sport-specific and sport-related decisions, was 
central to maintaining its Olympic authority in the 
organization of the Sydney Games. The members 
of the SSC had the capacity to make sport-specific 
and sport-related decisions, which was viewed as 
important, in that without the SSC members of the 
SOCOG Board would not only have had the power 
to make sport decisions, but also the power to defer 
or not to make decisions at all. As outlined by 
Lukes (1974), power relations in organizations are 
not only influenced by decisions that are made by a 
board, but also by “decisions” that are not made.
Future Research
As this study examined a single case, the Sydney 
2000 Olympic Games, the findings that emerged are 
(1981, 1984), suggesting that organizational power 
relations are influenced through strategy develop-
ment and technical innovation. Organizational power 
relations in this stage can be viewed as more than 
“power as relationships,” as outlined in the second 
circuit of power (Bathelt & Taylor, 2002). Rather, this 
circuit addresses an organization’s ability to exploit 
resources in new and novel ways in order to obtain a 
competitive advantage. In this stage “standing con-
ditions no longer stand. Rule fixing, meaning, and 
memberships are changed, potent uncertainty and 
dynamism [are introduced] into power relations” 
(Clegg, 1989, p. 236).
With the formation of the SSC, the SOCOG Board 
no longer maintained responsibility or authority for 
the sport department. A central (and unintended) 
consequence of the decision to transfer authority 
for sport to the SSC was that the SOCOG Board 
no longer needed to devote time to making deci-
sions regarding a crucial part of the Sydney Games. 
Instead the SOCOG Board focused on other strate-
gic and organizational matters that consume a lot of 
time and energy, such as the generation of income 
and the containment of costs. Due to this transfer in 
decision-making power, the SSC provided the sport 
department with the autonomy to make 540 deci-
sions between 1996 and 2001 (Frawley, 2010).
As has been alluded to earlier in this discussion, 
the power relations that can be exerted by a strong 
organizational department or subunit are interdepen-
dent on the available resources at a certain point in 
time (Dopson, 1997). This point was reinforced by a 
respondent who suggested that the sport department 
within an OCOG is often disadvantaged because of 
its place within the Olympic planning cycle (respon-
dent 16). In contrast to some large Olympic planning 
areas (such as venue management and marketing), 
sport-related planning grows in scope and staffing 
later in the event planning process and intensifies as 
the competition nears. The authority of the SSC, in 
this organizational context, reflected a rationalization 
that the sport department benefited from the AOC 
maintaining considerable power within SOCOG.
According to Clegg et al. (2006), “all forms of 
organization are forms of organization of social rela-
tions. All social relations involve power relations. 
Power is evident in relations not only of ownership 
and control but also of structuration and design” 
however, it was not the AOC’s agency alone that 
created the SSC. The authority of the AOC within 
SOCOG and the establishment and operation of the 
SCC were interdependent on both social and orga-
nizational structures and human agency. The formal 
authority of the AOC was institutionally interdepen-
dent, firstly on the governance of the IOC (as the 
event owner of the Olympic Games) and secondly 
on the NSW legal and political structures. These 
governance structures formed the foundation of the 
AOC’s organizational power within SOCOG.
Power as Relationships
Dispositional power is the second circuit of power 
outlined by Clegg (1989). Dispositional power refers 
to the rules that govern organizations and their mem-
bership. This circuit of power works through the cre-
ation of rules and regulations that are required to be 
followed if one is to remain a member of an organi-
zation or institution. In this stage, the power of status 
and the membership that they afford shape and influ-
ence power relations (Bathelt & Taylor, 2002). For 
example, as a bidding NOC for the 2000 Olympics, 
the AOC accepted the rules and regulations estab-
lished by the IOC through its Olympic Charter. Like-
wise, the NSW Government as the other central party 
to the bid not only had to agree to the rules and regu-
lations established by the IOC but also committed 
to the rules and regulations presented by the IOC’s 
representative in Australia, the AOC. This power was 
particularly expressed through the Endorsement Con-
tract between the AOC and the NSW Government 
signed in 1991 (Gordon, 1994, 2003). Dispositional 
power is therefore focused upon social and organi-
zational structures such as rules, regulations, and 
legislation. These social structures though are never 
entirely fixed; rather, they are relational and dynamic, 
changing when people and/or groups of people agree 
for them to be changed or modified (Stacey, 2007).
Power as Discipline
Facilitative power is the third circuit. In this circuit, 
the positive and strategic aspects of power relations 
are sketched. Here collective effort combines to pro-
duce positive organizational outcomes (Clegg et al., 
2006). Clegg (1989) draws on the work of Foucault 
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highly contextual. In order to build a more thorough 
understanding of mega-event organization, future 
research needs to be undertaken across multiple 
Olympic Games. Additional research should be con-
sidered that investigates Games that have already 
been staged. Such an approach could provide the 
opportunity for longitudinal analysis and a compari-
son of how various internal and external stakehold-
ers shape Olympic organization and implementation. 
In addition to the analysis of the role of host NOCs 
and host governments in Games organization other 
key stakeholders (i.e., the international sport federa-
tions, sponsors, host broadcasters, and international 
media) should be explored.
Through the analysis of multiple Olympic 
Games, the findings from this study can be further 
developed, extended, and refined. Such research 
could explore how Olympic stakeholders, such as 
host NOCs, design their organizational priorities 
and strategies when they are involved in the man-
agement of an Olympics. A longitudinal approach to 
researching Olympic organization, therefore, would 
add a great deal to the existing mega-event body of 
knowledge. This longer term research perspective 
also fits well with the approach outlined by  Eliasian 
organizational theorists. Researchers such as New-
ton (2001, 2004) and Dopson (2001, 2005), for 
instance, recommend that management researchers 
should spend more time considering the broader 
historical context when analyzing organizational 
development and change. They argue that such an 
approach provides management researchers with 
a fuller understanding of the organizational inter-
dependencies that shape stakeholder involvement 
and performance. Ultimately, this means that host 
NOCs as a vital stakeholder of the Olympic Games 
can achieve a deeper understanding of how they can 
best position themselves in order to achieve their 
organization’s objectives.
A second area worth exploring through future 
research is the role played by host NOCs in 
other parts of an OCOG outside the sport depart-
ment. There is scope for researchers to explore, 
for instance, the role of the AOC in the planning 
and organization of the Olympic village at the 
Sydney Games. The AOC, through the SSC, not 
only managed the SOCOG sport department but 
also played a prominent role in Olympic village 
(p. 89). On one hand the establishment of the SSC 
reflected the level of authority and control the AOC 
maintained within SOCOG, but on the other hand 
it also highlighted the interdependent relationship 
it had with the NSW Government. The AOC, as the 
host NOC, not only maintained institutional power, 
as formulated by the Olympic Charter, but it also 
began with and maintained substantial Olympic 
knowledge and expertise. The formation of the SSC 
allowed the AOC to use and maximize its knowl-
edge and experience within SOCOG. Knowledge 
and experience can play a “key role in extending, 
limiting, and otherwise shaping” organizational 
resources and property rights (Clegg, 2003, p. 536). 
Through the formation of the SSC, the AOC shaped 
its own Olympic future as well as the future experi-
ences of its constituents, the Olympic athletes the 
AOC stated it was there to serve and be “governed” 
by. As outlined by Dahl (1961), power researchers 
need to develop an understanding of organizations 
by asking the question: “Who governs?” More-
over, Putnam (1976) has commented that insofar 
as organizational decisions matter, so too do orga-
nizational decision makers. Having people with 
power who knew the Olympic movement and who 
made decisions in the best interests of the athletes 
was regarded as a critical feature of the SSC and 
the Sydney Olympics by those who worked in and 
managed the sport department.
The AOC’s institutional power within SOCOG, 
and especially its ability through the SSC to make 
sport-specific and sport-related decisions, was 
central to maintaining its Olympic authority in the 
organization of the Sydney Games. The members 
of the SSC had the capacity to make sport-specific 
and sport-related decisions, which was viewed as 
important, in that without the SSC members of the 
SOCOG Board would not only have had the power 
to make sport decisions, but also the power to defer 
or not to make decisions at all. As outlined by 
Lukes (1974), power relations in organizations are 
not only influenced by decisions that are made by a 
board, but also by “decisions” that are not made.
Future Research
As this study examined a single case, the Sydney 
2000 Olympic Games, the findings that emerged are 
(1981, 1984), suggesting that organizational power 
relations are influenced through strategy develop-
ment and technical innovation. Organizational power 
relations in this stage can be viewed as more than 
“power as relationships,” as outlined in the second 
circuit of power (Bathelt & Taylor, 2002). Rather, this 
circuit addresses an organization’s ability to exploit 
resources in new and novel ways in order to obtain a 
competitive advantage. In this stage “standing con-
ditions no longer stand. Rule fixing, meaning, and 
memberships are changed, potent uncertainty and 
dynamism [are introduced] into power relations” 
(Clegg, 1989, p. 236).
With the formation of the SSC, the SOCOG Board 
no longer maintained responsibility or authority for 
the sport department. A central (and unintended) 
consequence of the decision to transfer authority 
for sport to the SSC was that the SOCOG Board 
no longer needed to devote time to making deci-
sions regarding a crucial part of the Sydney Games. 
Instead the SOCOG Board focused on other strate-
gic and organizational matters that consume a lot of 
time and energy, such as the generation of income 
and the containment of costs. Due to this transfer in 
decision-making power, the SSC provided the sport 
department with the autonomy to make 540 deci-
sions between 1996 and 2001 (Frawley, 2010).
As has been alluded to earlier in this discussion, 
the power relations that can be exerted by a strong 
organizational department or subunit are interdepen-
dent on the available resources at a certain point in 
time (Dopson, 1997). This point was reinforced by a 
respondent who suggested that the sport department 
within an OCOG is often disadvantaged because of 
its place within the Olympic planning cycle (respon-
dent 16). In contrast to some large Olympic planning 
areas (such as venue management and marketing), 
sport-related planning grows in scope and staffing 
later in the event planning process and intensifies as 
the competition nears. The authority of the SSC, in 
this organizational context, reflected a rationalization 
that the sport department benefited from the AOC 
maintaining considerable power within SOCOG.
According to Clegg et al. (2006), “all forms of 
organization are forms of organization of social rela-
tions. All social relations involve power relations. 
Power is evident in relations not only of ownership 
and control but also of structuration and design” 
however, it was not the AOC’s agency alone that 
created the SSC. The authority of the AOC within 
SOCOG and the establishment and operation of the 
SCC were interdependent on both social and orga-
nizational structures and human agency. The formal 
authority of the AOC was institutionally interdepen-
dent, firstly on the governance of the IOC (as the 
event owner of the Olympic Games) and secondly 
on the NSW legal and political structures. These 
governance structures formed the foundation of the 
AOC’s organizational power within SOCOG.
Power as Relationships
Dispositional power is the second circuit of power 
outlined by Clegg (1989). Dispositional power refers 
to the rules that govern organizations and their mem-
bership. This circuit of power works through the cre-
ation of rules and regulations that are required to be 
followed if one is to remain a member of an organi-
zation or institution. In this stage, the power of status 
and the membership that they afford shape and influ-
ence power relations (Bathelt & Taylor, 2002). For 
example, as a bidding NOC for the 2000 Olympics, 
the AOC accepted the rules and regulations estab-
lished by the IOC through its Olympic Charter. Like-
wise, the NSW Government as the other central party 
to the bid not only had to agree to the rules and regu-
lations established by the IOC but also committed 
to the rules and regulations presented by the IOC’s 
representative in Australia, the AOC. This power was 
particularly expressed through the Endorsement Con-
tract between the AOC and the NSW Government 
signed in 1991 (Gordon, 1994, 2003). Dispositional 
power is therefore focused upon social and organi-
zational structures such as rules, regulations, and 
legislation. These social structures though are never 
entirely fixed; rather, they are relational and dynamic, 
changing when people and/or groups of people agree 
for them to be changed or modified (Stacey, 2007).
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Facilitative power is the third circuit. In this circuit, 
the positive and strategic aspects of power relations 
are sketched. Here collective effort combines to pro-
duce positive organizational outcomes (Clegg et al., 
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